Presentation at IIW22

Revocable Biometrics

Francisco Corella fcorella@pomcor.com

Karen Lewison
kplewison@pomcor.com



Traditional Biometrics

Enrollment:

Enrollment sample (raw data, e.g. bitmap) => Enrollment code (features) =>

Template

Authentication:

Authentication sample => authentication code Match authentication code against template



Privacy Danger

- Template => sample that can be successfully matched against template
- Adversary who captures template can impersonate user
- User cannot recover from the compromise because the biometric credential is not revocable



Revocable Biometrics


Enrollment

- Enrollment sample (bitmap) => enrollment code (features)
- Enrollment code + random bits => biometric key + helper data
- Helper data is stored for use at authentication time

Authentication

- Authentication sample => authentication code
- Authentication code + helper data => same biometric key if sample is genuine







Revocable Biometrics, continued

- Biometric key can be used for authentication
 - As bearer token, or
 - As symmetric key that signs a challenge
- Biometric key and helper data can be revoked because they are randomized
- AND... no useful information can be obtained from the helper data



Revocable Biometrics Using Error Correction System

Enrollment

- Biometric key generated at random
- Biometric key + redundancy => codeword
- Enrollment sample => enrollment code
- Enrollment code ⊕ codeword => helper data

Authentication

- Authentication sample => authentication code
- Authentication code ⊕ helper data =
 authentication code ⊕ (enrollment code ⊕ codeword) =
 (authentication code ⊕ enrollment code) ⊕ codeword
 bits that differ ⊕ codeword
- Error correction system can recover codeword if sample is genuine
- Biometric key recovered by dropping redundancy from codeword



Best Result

- Hao, Anderson & Daugman, "Combining biometrics with cryptography effectively", IEEE Transactions on Computers 55(9), pages 1081-1088, 2006
 - Iris
 - 140-bit biometric key
- Reported experimental results:
 - -0.47% FRR
 - 0% FAR



Caveats

- Biometric key ⊕ helper data = biometric code
- Low entropy for modalities other than iris



Multifactor Authentication

- Low entropy for modalities other than iris can be addressed with MFA
- Example: 3FA
 - Biometric key
 - Password
 - Uncertified key pair



Enhanced 3FA

- Password deserves protection against security breach of a back-end database because it has intrinsic value if reused
- Joint hash method
 - Password hashed with public key and optionally with biometric key, rather than salt
 - Public key not stored in back-end
- Protocredential method
 - Password and biometric key not sent to back-end
 - Instead, they are used to regenerate an uncertified key pair from a protocredential



Thank you for your attention!

For more information:

Web site: pomcor.com

Blog: pomcor.com/blog

Francisco Corella fcorella@pomcor.com

Karen Lewison

kplewison@pomcor.com

Any questions?

