Virtual Tamper Resistance is the Answer to the HCE Conundrum

Host Card Emulation (HCE) is a technique pioneered by SimplyTapp and integrated by Google into Android as of 4.4 KitKat that allows an Android app running in a mobile device equipped with an NFC controller to emulate the functionality of a contactless smart card. Prior to KitKat the NFC controller routed the NFC interface to a secure element, either a secure element integrated in a carrier-controlled SIM, or a different secure element embedded in the phone itself. This allowed carriers to block the use of Google Wallet, which competes with the carrier-developed NFC payment technology that used to be called ISIS and is now called SoftCard. (I’m not sure if or how they blocked Google Wallet in devices with an embedded secure element.) Using HCE, Google Wallet can run on the host CPU where it cannot be blocked by carriers. (HCE also paves the way to the development of a variety of NFC applications, for payments or other purposes, as Android apps that do not have to be provisioned to a secure element.)

But the advantages of HCE are offset by a serious disadvantage. An HCE application cannot count on a secure element to protect payment credentials if the device is stolen, which is a major concern because more then three million phones where stolen last year in the US alone. If the payment credentials are stored in ordinary persistent storage supplied by Android, a thief who steals the device can obtain the credentials by rooting the device or, with more effort, by opening the device and probing the flash memory.

Last February Visa and MasterCard declared their support for HCE. Continue reading “Virtual Tamper Resistance is the Answer to the HCE Conundrum”