Tag: Cybersecurity

In the last post of the TLS traffic visibility series, before a survey of solutions, I drew attention to how in TLS 1.3 different kinds of traffic are protected under different keys and sometimes with different ciphers, and how client and server can update their application traffic keys at any time. I referred to this as the multiple protection state problem of TLS 1.3.

This problem means that PFS visibility solutions where a single symmetric session key per direction of traffic is sent to a passive visibility middlebox will not work for TLS 1.3 even if they work for TLS 1.2. I mentioned two such solutions in the previous post, one of them being Nubeva’s Symmetric Key Intercept (SKI), described in a presentation at a NIST workshop.

In response to the blog post, Nubeva has sent me a detailed explanation of how their SKI solution handles the multiplicity of symmetric keys in TLS 1.3. It turns out that, although the solution is called Symmetric Key Intercept and the workshop presentation referred to the extraction of symmetric keys from system memory, it is not the symmetric keys that are extracted and sent to a decryptor, but rather the TLS 1.3 traffic secrets, from which the symmetric keys are derived by the decryptor as described in Nubeva’s response.

Continue reading “Nubeva Explains How It handles TLS 1.3 Key Updates in Response to Pomcor Blog Post”

This is the fifth and last post of a series on providing visibility of TLS 1.3 traffic in the intranet. An index to the series and related materials can be found in the TLS Traffic Visibility page.

Update. This post has been updated in response to a clarification received from Nubeva. See the section on SKI below and the next blog post.

It is well known that TLS 1.3 has created a visibility problem for encrypted intranet traffic by removing the static RSA key exchange method. Except in PSK-only mode, TLS 1.3 traffic has forward secrecy protection and cannot be decrypted by a passive middlebox provisioned with a static private key. This is known as the PFS visibility problem, where PFS stands for “perfect” forward secrecy.

But there is no awareness yet of a second problem created by TLS 1.3 that makes it harder to solve the PFS visibility problem than is generally understood. I call it the multiple protection state problem.

TLS 1.2 has PFS cipher suites, and therefore it has its own PFS visibility problem. If a client insists on using a PFS cipher suite, a passive middlebox provisioned with a static private key won’t be able to decrypt the traffic. Some existing TLS visibility solutions provide the middlebox with the symmetric keys used to protect the traffic, rather than with the private key used to perform the key exchange. Such solutions are being successfully deployed for decrypting TLS 1.2 traffic. But the multiple protection state problem means that those solutions are not applicable to TLS 1.3.

I realized this as I was working on a survey of TLS visibility solutions. The problem is described in the next section and the survey can be found in the following section.

Continue reading “A Survey of Existing and Proposed TLS Visibility Solutions”

This is the fourth post of a series on providing visibility of TLS 1.3 traffic in the intranet. An index to the series and related materials can be found in the TLS Traffic Visibility page.

In earlier posts I have proposed a solution for the intranet visibility problem of TLS 1.3 based on the establishment of a visibility shared secret (VSS) between the TLS server and a visibility middlebox, using a long term TCP connection on the same or a different wire than the TLS connection. The visibility middlebox does not relay the TLS traffic: it uses port mirroring to observe the traffic, decrypts it (or, using TLS 1.3 terminology, deprotects it), and forwards the plaintext to a monitoring facility. The solution has a secret derivation (SD) variant where the middlebox derives the TLS 1.3 traffic secrets on its own, and a secret transmission (ST) variant where the server sends the traffic secrets to the middlebox encrypted under keys derived from VSS.

But a server that upgrades to TLS 1.3 must continue to support clients that use earlier versions of TLS. TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 have been deprecated, but TLS 1.2 may remain in use for many years. In this post I introduce a third variant that provides visibility for TLS 1.2 in addition to TLS 1.3. This two-version (2V) variant uses a handshake-agnostic visibility middlebox to handle all the key exchange modes of both versions of TLS, and preserves forward secrecy for those modes that provide it. At the end of this post I also describe a VSS precomputation feature, usable in all three variants, that I have mentioned in earlier posts but not discussed in detail yet.

Continue reading “A Two-Version Visibility Solution for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 based on a Handshake-Agnostic Middlebox”

This is the third post of a series on providing visibility of TLS 1.3 traffic in the intranet. An index to the series and related materials can be found in the TLS Traffic Visibility page.

Update. This post has been updated to say that, in the ST variant, the messages that convey the traffic secrets also convey the two-byte designation of the cipher suite that specifies the AEAD algorithm to be used with the keys derived from the secrets, and that the messages include the connection ID of the client-server connection as the AEAD associated data. The middlebox needs to be told what algorithm to use to decrypt early data if the early data is rejected by the server.

TLS 1.3 has created a problem for enterprises by discontinuing all key exchange methods that use static key pairs. In the first post of this series I described a solution to this problem that preserves forward secrecy, based on the establishment of an ephemeral shared secret between the TLS server and a visibility middlebox. In the second post I provided full details of the solution for the (EC)DHE-only key exchange mode of TLS 1.3. In this post I show how the solution can be extended to handle the PSK-only and PSK + (EC)DHE key exchange modes and the 0-RTT feature of TLS 1.3 by providing the PSK to the middlebox. In this post I also introduce a variant of the solution that handles the PSK modes without the middlebox having to know the PSK and provides different benefits. Both variants can be used in all three key exchange modes of TLS 1.3.

Continue reading “Extending the TLS 1.3 Visibility Solution to Include PSK and 0-RTT”

This is the second post of a series on providing visibility of TLS 1.3 traffic in the intranet. An index to the series and related materials can be found in the TLS Traffic Visibility page.

TLS 1.3 has created a major problem for enterprise data centers. The new version of the protocol has discontinued the RSA ciphersuites, as well as the static Diffie Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) ciphersuites, leaving Ephemeral DH (DHE) and Ephemeral ECDH (ECDHE) as the only key exchange primitives based on asymmetric cryptography. These primitives provide forward secrecy, but make it impossible to inspect TLS traffic in the intranet by provisioning a middlebox with a static RSA key, as is done for earlier versions of TLS. Since traffic inspection is necessary for essential tasks such as troubleshooting, attack detection and compliance audits, enterprises cannot migrate to TLS 1.3 without a solution to this problem.

On September 25 NIST held a workshop to discuss the problem. Before the workshop I posted a quick write up on this blog proposing a solution that provides plaintext visibility of the TLS traffic while preserving the forward secrecy provided by TLS 1.3. This post explains the solution in more detail with reference to the specification of TLS 1.3 in RFC 8446, and includes security considerations and performance considerations.

Continue reading “Protocol-Level Details of the TLS 1.3 Visibility Solution”

This is the first post of a series on providing visibility of TLS 1.3 traffic in the intranet. An index to the series and related materials can be found in the TLS Traffic Visibility page.

Update. I have corrected the post to say that the middlebox and the server must both use an ephemeral key pair for their key exchange.

Update. I said that the TLS server uses a key derivation function to derive a key pair from the secret that it shares with the middlebox. I should have said, more precisely, that it uses the secret to derive bits that are then used to generate a key pair. I’ve corrected this below, and I will write another post to provide more details.

TLS 1.3 has removed the static RSA and static Diffie-Hellman cipher suites, so that all key exchange mechanisms based on public-key cryptography now provide forward secrecy. This is great for security, but creates a problem for enterprise deployments of the TLS protocol.

As explained in the Enterprise Transport Security specification of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), enterprises need to inspect the network traffic inside their data centers for reasons including application health monitoring, troubleshooting, intrusion detection, detection of malware activity, detection of denial-of-service attacks, and compliance audits.

Visibility of plaintext network traffic is usually achieved by means of passive middleboxes that observe the encrypted network traffic and are able to decrypt it. When a middlebox observes a TLS 1.2 key exchange, if the server uses a static RSA or static Diffie-Hellman key pair and the middlebox is provided with a copy of the private key component of the static key pair, the middlebox can compute the session keys in the same manner as the server, and use the session keys to decrypt the subsequent traffic.

The problem is that this method cannot be used with TLS 1.3, and enterprise data centers cannot refuse to upgrade and get stuck at TLS 1.2 forever.

The above mentioned ETSI specification proposes a clever solution. The TLS client and server follow the TLS 1.3 specification, but the server cheats by using a static Diffie-Hellman key pair while pretending to use an ephemeral one, and shares the static private key with the middlebox. This solution works, but fails to achieve the security benefit of forward secrecy.

I would like to propose instead a solution, illustrated in Figure 1, that requires no cheating and achieves both forward secrecy and visibility of the traffic plaintext to the middlebox.

The TLS client and the TLS server fully implement TLS 1.3. When the server and the middlebox see the ClientHello message, they perform a Diffie-Hellman (DH) or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange where each side (server and middlebox) uses an ephemeral key pair whose public key component is signed by the private key component of a long-term signature key pair. The result of this (EC)DH key exchange is an ephemeral secret shared between the TLS server and the middlebox. The TLS server uses that shared secret to derive bits, by means of a key derivation algorithm such as HKDF, that it in turn uses to generate an (EC)DH key pair that it uses in the TLS key exchange. This (EC)DH key pair is ephemeral and provides forward secrecy, because it is derived from the ephemeral shared secret. The middlebox uses the shared secret to derive the same ephemeral (EC)DH key pair in the same manner as the TLS server. Then it uses that shared ephemeral key pair to compute the session keys, and uses the session keys to decrypt the subsequent traffic.

Next post in this series: Protocol-Level Details of the TLS 1.3 Visibility Solution.