Crytpographic Library (PJCL).
initial public release
provided digital signature functionality,
which we had been using internally for our own research
on authentication and identity proofing.
This release adds key agreement
and key derivation functionality. The next release will provide
symmetric and asymmetric encryption primitives, including
AES and RSA. To be notified of future releases you may
sign up for the
user forum, subscribe
to the feed of this blog, or follow me on Twitter (@fcorella).
(Update: The PJCL user forum has been discontinued as of May 27, 2018.)
This blog post is a companion to a presentation made at the 2017 International Cryptographic Module Conference and refers to the presentation slides, revised after the conference. Karen Lewison is a co-author of the presentation and of this blog post.
Slide 2: Key storage in web clients
Most Web applications today use TLS, thus relying on cryptography to provide a secure channel between client and server, and to authenticate the server to the client by means of a cryptographic credential, consisting of a TLS server certificate and its associated private key. But other uses of cryptography by Web applications are still rare. Client authentication still relies primarily on traditional username-and-password, one-time passwords, proof of possession of a mobile phone, biometrics, or combinations of two or more of such authentication factors. Web payments still rely on a credit card number being considered a secret. Encrypted messaging is on the rise, but is not Web-based.
A major obstacle to broader use of cryptography by Web applications is the problem of where to store cryptographic keys on the client side. Continue reading “Storing Cryptographic Keys in Persistent Browser Storage”
In a press release, MasterCard announced yesterday an EMV payment card that features a fingerprint reader. The release said that two trials have been recently concluded in South Africa and, after additional trials, a full roll out is expected this year.
In the United States, EMV chip cards are used without a PIN. The fingerprint reader is no doubt intended to fill that security gap. But any use of biometrics raises privacy concerns. Perhaps to address such concerns, the press release stated that a fingerprint template stored in the card is “encrypted”.
That’s puzzling. If the template is encrypted, what key is used to decrypt it before use?Continue reading “What kind of “encrypted fingerprint template” is used by MasterCard?”
One thing I like about the Internet Identity Workshop (IIW) is its unconference format, which allows for impromptu sessions. A discussion during one session can raise an issue that deserves its own session, and an impromptu session can be called the same day or the following day to discuss it. A good example of this happened at the last IIW (IIW XXII), which was held on April 26-28, 2016 at the Computer History Museum in Mountain View, California.
During the second day of the workshop, a participant in a session drew attention to one of the dangers of using biometrics for authentication, viz. the fact that biometrics are not revocable. This is true in the sense that you cannot change at will the biometric features of the human body, and it is a strong reason for using biometrics sparingly; but I pointed out that there is something called “revocable biometrics”. Continue reading “Revocable Biometrics Discussion at the Internet Identity Workshop”
Last July, the National Security Agency (NSA) issued CNSS Advisory Memorandum 02-15, available at the Advisory Memoranda page, updating the list of cryptographic algorithms that can be used in National Security Systems (NSS). A subsequent document referred to the new algorithms as the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA Suite), which replaces Suite B. The transition to the CNSA Suite took place two months before a Suite B deadline to discontinue the use of RSA, DH and DSA and rely exclusively on ECC algorithms for public key cryptosystems. The subsequent document explained the motivation for the transition by saying that “the growth of elliptic curve use has bumped up against the fact of continued progress in the research on quantum computing, which has made it clear that elliptic curve cryptography is not the long term solution many once hoped it would be,” and announced “preliminary plans” for a future transition to quantum-resistant algorithms.
This abrupt change of course, following many years of promoting ECC, took the cryptographic community by surprise. Continue reading “NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B, but Fail to Explain One Important Detail”
Last week I participated in the third International Cryptographic Module Conference (ICMC), organized by the Cryptographic Module User Forum (CMUF), and concerned with the validation of cryptographic modules against government and international standards. You may think of cryptographic module validation as a dry topic, but it was quite an exciting conference, full of technical and political controversy. The technical controversy resulted from the fact that the standards are out of sync with current technology and it is not at all clear how they can be fixed. The political controversy resulted from the fact that, after Snowden’s revelations, it is not at all clear who should try to fix them. The organizers signalled that they were not afraid of controversy by inviting as keynote speakers both Phil Zimmerman, creator of PGP and co-founder of Silent Circle, and Marianne Bailey, Deputy CIO for Cybersecurity at the US Department of Defense, besides well known expert Paul Kocher of SSL fame. I enjoyed an exchange between Zimmerman and Bailey on the imbalance between defense and offense at the NSA and its impact on cybersecurity. Continue reading “Cryptographic Module Standards at a Crossroads after Snowden’s Revelations”
Bluetooth has a bad reputation when it comes to security. Many vulnerabilities have been found over the years in the technology, and many successful attacks have been demonstrated against it. But the Bluetooth specification has also changed much over the years, and each revision of the specification has made substantial changes to the Bluetooth security protocols. Whether the latest protocols are secure is a question open to debate. This question is especially important when Bluetooth is used in emerging medical and Internet-of-Things applications where security flaws have safety implications. But it has also come up recently in the context of the Derived Credentials being standardized by NIST for authentication of Federal employees who use mobile devices.
(This is a continuation of the last two posts, which reported on the recent NIST Workshop on PIV-Related Special Publications. It is also the last of a seven-part series of posts discussing the public comments on Draft SP 800-157: Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials, and the final version of the publication. Links to all the posts in the series can be found here.)
Before tackling the question of whether Bluetooth is secure today, Continue reading “Has Bluetooth Become Secure?”